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Abstract
Between 1947 and 1952 170,000 Displaced Persons (DPs) arrived in Australia as International Refugee
Organisation (IRO)-sponsored refugees. This article sets out the international historical and political
context for the migration of DPs to Australia, and interrogates the "bureaucratic labelling" inherent in the
category "Displaced Persons". The post-war refugees were presented internationally as "Displaced
Persons"; "refugees"; "political refugees"; and eventually, in an effort to solve the population crisis, as
potential "workers" and "migrants". This article will describe the historical origin of the terms "Displaced
Persons" "refugees", "political exiles" and "migrants"- terms which were, and continue to be, relevant and
problematic.
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Displaced Persons and the Politics of International Categorisation(s)
Ten million displaced persons in Europe are stateless, homeless, and
hopeless. – YMCA, 1946.1
It is the processes of labeling as much as the labels themselves which are
of significance. – Roger Zetter.2

170,000 Displaced Persons (DPs) – predominantly Central and Eastern
Europeans – arrived in Australia as International Refugee Organisation
(IRO)-sponsored refugees between 1947 and 1952. They were Australia’s
first, experimental, mass of non-British migrants. This article sets out the
international historical and political context for the migration of DPs to
Australia, and interrogates the “bureaucratic labelling” inherent in the
category ‘Displaced Persons’.3 Contrary to contemporary representations
as an “anonymous mass”, the DPs were a heterogenous grouping
politically, culturally and socially.4 Many were never part of the original
post-war cohort of ‘Displaced Persons’ and only officially became
‘refugees’ in 1948 in the context of the Cold War, when they became
‘political refugees’. The DPs were then sold as potential ‘workers’ and/or
‘migrants’ available to make up the post-war labour shortfall and assist in
1

F. J. Massey, national general secretary of the YMCA, cited in ‘Millions Homeless and Without
Hope in Shattered Europe’, The Mercury (Hobart, Tas), 3 June, 1946.
2
Roger Zetter, ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity’, Journal
of Refugee Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (1991), p. 44.
3
Zetter, ‘Labelling Refugees’, p. 39.
4
Anna Holian, Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in
Postwar Germany (Michigan, 2011), p. 47.
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national economic regeneration. This article will describe the historical
origin of the terms ‘Displaced Persons’, ‘refugees’, ‘political exiles’ and
‘migrants’; terms which were, and continue to be, relevant and
problematic.

‘Displaced Persons’

The term ‘Displaced Persons’, or ‘DPs’, has become the generic name for
those

groups

of

people

resettled

by the

International Refugee

Organisation (IRO) following the Second World War, including those
technically classified as ‘Displaced Persons’, and the later ‘refugees’ from
Soviet-occupied countries. Use of the term ‘Displaced Persons’ in
international parlance began in 1944 when the Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), commanded by the United States’
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, attempted to categorise those refugees
anticipated to be displaced as a result of the war. According to the SHAEF
Plan for the Allied invasion of Western Europe (Operation Overlord),
‘Displaced Persons’ would be separate from those ‘refugees’ displaced
within their own country. ‘Displaced Persons’ were to be specifically those
outside their national boundaries and either “desirous” but “unable to
return to their home … without assistance” or who were to be returned to
“enemy or ex-enemy territory”.5 Displaced Persons were to include:

5

The National Archives, War Office (WO) 204/2869, War Office: Allied Forces, Mediterranean
Theatre: Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War, Refugees and displaced persons in

3
Evacuees, war or political fugitives, political prisoners, forced or
voluntary workers, Todt workers [forced labourers], and former
members of forces under German command, deportees, intruded
persons, extruded persons, civilian internees, ex-prisoners of war,
and stateless persons.6
On emergent understanding then, before the end of the Second World
War, Displaced Persons were those persons who found themselves
outside their own country, predominantly in Germany and Austria. The
grouping included concentration camp inmates, voluntary and forced
labourers, (non-German) soldiers in military units withdrawing westwards,
and civilian evacuees fleeing west from the oncoming Russian Army.
These groups were made up predominantly of Jewish and non-Jewish
Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, Belarussians, ‘Balts’ (Estonians, Latvians
and Lithuanians), Hungarians, Yugoslavs and nationals of Romania,
Bulgaria and Albania. Displaced ethnic Germans were the only group
outside its state borders not included in the Allied’s official category of
Displaced Person; they were collectively excluded from the group of
‘deserving’ victims.7

the Mediterranean Theatre: administration and movement: policy and correspondence, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Adm. Memo No. 39 (1 January 1944),
http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope, viewed 23 November 2010, p. 18.
6
The National Archives, London, Foreign Office (FO) 1052/10, Control Office for Germany and
Austria and Foreign Office: Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Prisoners of
War/Displaced Persons Division: Registered Files (PWDP and other Series), SHAEF planning
directive: refugees and displaced persons (DPs) (3 June 1944),
http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope, viewed 23 November 2010.
7
G. Daniel Cohen, ‘The West and the Displaced, 1945-1951: The Post-War Roots of Political
Refugees’, PhD Thesis, Department of History/Institute of French Studies, New York University,
January 2000, p. 45; Dan Stone, ‘Introduction’, Post-War Europe: Refugees, Exiles and
Resettlement, 1945-1950, The National Archives, UK, and the Wiener Library, London,
http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope/essays.asp, viewed 9 December 2009, p. 2.
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Notwithstanding the exclusion of ethnic Germans, the numbers of officially
categorised Displaced Persons were staggering. By August 1944 there
were 7.6 million foreign civilian labourers and prisoners of war working in
Germany itself, comprising around 29% of the Reich’s industrial labour
force and 20% of the total labour force.8 It has been estimated that
towards the end of the war approximately 13.5 million foreigners worked in
the German economy, and at least 12 million were forced labourers.
Around 11 million survived the war. There were also several hundred
thousand foreigners who had been imported into German-controlled
territories and more than a million forced labourers in the Todt
Organisation (a Third Reich civil and military engineering group),
constructing coastal fortifications throughout Northern Europe and
Southern France.9 In addition, it has been estimated that in May 1945 up
to 10% of the 7.8 million troops wearing German uniforms were nonGerman.10 In all, there were approximately 12 million classifiable
Displaced Persons in and around Europe at the conclusion of the war in
May 1945.11

8

Mark Spoerer and Jochen Fleischhacker, ‘Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories,
Numbers, and Survivors’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 22, no. 2 (Autumn 2002), p.
171; Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees 1939-52, A Study in Forced Population
Movement (London, 1957), p. 79; Mark Wyman, DPs: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 1945-51
(Ithaca NY, 1998), p. 22.
9
Proudfoot, European Refugees, p. 81.
10
David Cesarani, Justice Delayed: How Britain Became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals
(London, 2001 [1992]), p. 35.
11
The National Archives, FO 1052/10, Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign
Office: Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Prisoners of War/Displaced Persons
Division: Registered Files (PWDP and other Series), SHAEF planning directive: refugees and
displaced persons (DPs) (3 June 1944), http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope, viewed 23
November 2010; Louise W. Holborn, The International Refuee Organisation: A specialized
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Representations of the DPs in the immediate post-war period were
uniformly negative. To the post-war Germans, the DPs were known as
schlechte Ausländern (bad or dirty foreigners), and “held in the greatest
contempt”. To Allied military authorities, they were ‘surplus population’ and
‘a nuisance’: ‘kriegies’ (POWs), ‘goddam DPs’ and ‘lousy Poles’.12 Jewish
DPs (and it was soon ordered that all Jewish survivors were to be
categorized as DPs), who made up 20% of the immediate post-war
refugee population, were described by US General George S. Patton Jr. in
1945 as “lower than animals”.13 They were all, however, the responsibility
of the Allied authorities.

After SHAEF ceased functioning in July 1945, the Displaced Persons
came under the care of American, British and French military authorities.14
Two international organisations were involved on the periphery: the Office
of the League of Nations High Commissioner, a merger incorporating the

agency of the United Nations, its history and work, 1946-1952 (London: Oxford University Press,
1956), p. 395.
12
Hulme, The Wild Place, p. 18; Rieko Karatani, ‘How History Separated Refugee and Migrant
Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 17,
no. 3 (2005), p. 520; UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, US Zone Office of the Director, PAG4/3.0.11.3.0:9, ‘Confidential Report on the General Situation of DPs to the Director General of
UNRRA, Sep 1946’, cited in Yury Boshyk, ‘Repatriation and Resistance: Ukrainian Refugees and
Displaced Persons in Occupied Germany and Austria, 1945-48’, in Anna C. Bramwell, Refugees
in the Age of Total War (London, 1988), p. 202; Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European
Refugees from the First World War Through the Cold War (Philadelphia, 1985 [2002]), p. 300.
13
Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust (New York, 1982), p. 16;
Proudfoot, European Refugees, p. 350; Dushnyck and Gibbons, Refugees are People, p. 12;
Gerard Daniel Cohen, ‘The Politics of Recognition: Jewish Refugees in Relief Policies and
Human Rights Debates, 1945-1950’, Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 24, no. 2 (2006), p. 135.
14
Arieh Kochavi, ‘The Politics of Displaced Persons in Post-War Europe, 1945-1950’, Post-War
Europe: Refugees, Exiles and Resettlement, 1945-1950, p. 2.
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Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany and
the Nansen International Office, and which provided legal protection and
material aid to refugees from 1938 to 1946; and the Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees, which had been set up as a result of the Evian
Conference in 1938 to assist Jewish migration from Germany and Austria,
and then in 1943 to care for all refugees.15 The main international body,
however, was the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(UNRRA), which was initiated in late 1943 so that “preparation and
arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their
homes”.16

UNRRA was a successor of sorts to earlier refugee relief organisations,
such as the American Relief Administration (1919-1923) and various
Offices under the auspices of the League of Nations. However, rather than
relying on charitable and philanthropic bodies, it established an Americanled internationalization of relief operations.17 In November 1943, the 44
nation signatories of UNRRA agreed not only to care for the DPs, but also
to relieve war victims at the request of national governments. UNRRA
would provide basic necessities, with a goal towards rehabilitation. At all

15

The National Archives, FO 371/51138-0008, Foreign Office: Political Departments: General
Correspondence from 1906-1967, Future of Inter-Governmental Committee (5 September 1945),
http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope, viewed 23 November 2010.
16
M. L. Kovacs, ‘Immigration and Assimilation: An Outline Account of the IRO Immigrants in
Australia’, MA Thesis, Department of History, University of Melbourne, 1955, pp. 182-183; NLA,
MS 8128, Unpublished manuscript by Harland Gordon (H.G.) Brooks (Department of
Immigration), ‘Displaced Persons Volume 1’, pp. 4, 7.
17
G. Daniel Cohen, ‘Between Relief and Politics: Refugee Humanitarianism in Occupied
Germany 1945 1946’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 43, no. 3 (2008), pp. 437, 439.
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times, UNRRA operated under military jurisdiction and was largely
dependent on military supplies. Their ‘first and most urgent’ task, however,
was to organize the DPs.18 UNRRA’s ideological basis for this task was
not only to “bind up the world’s wounds” but also to propagate an
American-led “new growth of confidence [in international administration]
which is indispensable for the future system of general security”.19

The main aim of UNRRA in this period, in relation to the DPs, was to
assist in refugee repatriation. However, some rehabilitation and material
support was required until an eventual return home became possible. In
effect, this meant providing all DPs with food and clothing rations initially
sourced within Germany and supplemented by Red Cross parcels, and
housing millions of homeless DPs in around 900 (mostly nationalityspecific) camps across Germany, Austria and Italy, which were often
former concentration camps.20 In this way, as historian Daniel Cohen has
described, UNRRA “functioned as an alternative welfare state for stateless
people”.21 According to the British Army, this “gigantic” task involved:
Controlling and transporting … men, women and children; the
setting up or adaptation of camps for them; disinfestations and
organization of hygiene and sanitation measures … feeding,
watering, and clothing; checking and documentation; the provision
18

Jessica Reinisch, ‘Preparing for a new World Order: UNRRA and the International
Management of Refugees’, Post-War Europe: Refugees, Exiles and Resettlement, 1945-1950.
The National Archives, UK, and the Wiener Library, London,
www.tlemea.com/postwareurope/essay4.asp, viewed 9 December 2009, pp. 4, 5.
19
Cited in Jessica Reinisch, “’We Shall Rebuild Anew a Powerful Nation’: UNRRA,
Internationalism and National Reconstruction in Poland’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 43
(2008), p. 452.
20
Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust, p. 17.
21
Cohen, ‘Between Relief and Politics’, p. 439.
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of medical attention and supplies, the control of disease, and in the
case of those who were not to be speedily repatriated, the initiation
of rehabilitation, education and entertainment.22

DPs also received special benefits in a post-war Germany. Many were
employed by the Allied military authorities, and all received rations of
American cigarettes to use as black market currency, as well as being
outside German jurisdiction.23 This reliance on welfare resulted in a new
characterisation, that of the “professional DP … sitting pretty under the
protection of UNRRA”.24

The repatriation attempts were successful in part: for many, “there was
great enthusiasm about going home”.25 The Allied military authorities
repatriated about 7 million within less than six months after the end of the
war, and UNRRA repatriated another million over the following 18
months.26 However, UNRRA soon came up against problematic DPs who
either had nowhere to return to, or refused repatriation, citing
“persecution”: all Jews, who were formally classified as ‘stateless’, and
those (old and new) Soviet citizens who refused to return to communist

22

War Office 205/139 Public Record Office, Notes on ‘G’ Activities of 21 Army Group during PostSurrender Period, cited in Carol Mather, Aftermath of War: Everyone Must Go Home (London,
1992), p. 16.
23
M. L. Kovacs and A. J. Cropley, Immigrants and Society: Alienation and Assimilation (Sydney,
1975), p. 85.
24
Hulme, The Wild Place, p. 70.
25
Francesca M. Wilson, Aftermath: France, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, 1945 and 1946 (West
Drayton, Middlesex, England, 1947), p. 83.
26
Klaus Neumann, Refuge Australia: Australia’s Humanitarian Record (Sydney, 2004), p. 30.
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rule in their homelands.27 Others were initially repatriated and then
returned to the DP camps – these were classed as uncatalogued
refugees, that is, no longer official DPs, “free-livers” outside the DP camp
system.28

Soviet Citizen ‘Displaced Persons’

The Yalta Agreement of 1945 had promised the return of Soviet citizens to
their pre-August 1939 homes (DPs from areas incorporated into the Soviet
Union since September 1939 were not to be repatriated nor treated as
Soviet citizens “unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship”). As
many Soviet citizens had no wish to return home, repatriation was at times
forcibly carried out by Allied military authorities “regardless of [the DPs’]
personal wishes”.29 Ukrainian writer, and DP, Ivan Bahryany explained in
1947 in an English-language article in the Ukrainian Weekly, why so many
‘Soviet citizens’ refused to repatriate:
I am a Ukrainian, 35 years old, born in the region of Poltava of
laboring parents and now I am living with no fixed residence, in
constant want, wandering like a homeless cur around Europe —
hiding from the repatriation committees of the USSR, who want to
send me "home". I do not want to go "home". There are hundreds
of thousands of us who do not want to. They can come for us with
loaded rifles, but we will put up a desperate resistance — for we
prefer to die in a foreign land rather than go back to that "home". I
put that word in quotation marks, for it is filled with horror, for it
shows the unparalleled cynicism of the Soviet propaganda directed
against us: the Bolsheviks have made for 100 nationalities one
27

Cohen, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, p. 136.
Hulme, The Wild Place, p. 116.
29
Foreign Office 1052/260, Directive from SHAEF to 21 Army Group, 14 June 1945, cited in
Mather, Aftermath of War, p. 19; Dushnyck and Gibbons, Refugees are People, p. 51.
28
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"Soviet home" and by that term they are building the terrible "prison
of peoples", the so-called USSR.30
This feeling of “horror” in response to the USSR was exacerbated by the
Soviet persecution of returnees. There was a general assumption in
Soviet lands that all returnees, particularly POWs (but even forced
labourers), had been collaborators of the Nazi regime and this led to
“complicated, often crippled fates” for those forced to return.31 Historian
Tony Judt has estimated that one in five Soviet returnees were either shot
or deported to the Gulag.32 Others were turned back at the border by state
officials, while many DPs received letters from family members warning
them not to travel home. Soviet officials suggested that loyalty to
homelands had been softened by the safe and comfortable camp
environment, where “they do not work hard and they are set in a special
atmosphere which is not normal”.33 The Soviets alleged that the DPs
were being “nourished” in the camps as “tools of aggression for foreign
powers”.34 The forced repatriations by Allied military authorities ceased
around the end of 1945 as it became apparent that large numbers of
Soviet repatriates were being met with violence, deported to Gulags or

30

Ivan Bahryany, ‘Why I Do Not Want to Go “Home”’, Ukrainian Weekly, 17 February 1947, p. 3,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/16475947/The-Ukrainian-Weekly-194707, viewed 9 February 2010.
31
Gelinada Grinchenko, ‘Ukrainian Ostarbeiters of the Third Reich: Remembering Patterns on
th
Forced Labour in Nazi Germany’, Conference Paper, 14 International Oral History Conference,
Sydney, 2007 (unpublished), p. 5.
32
Tony Judt, cited in Dan Stone, ‘Introduction’, Post-War Europe: Refugees, Exiles and
Resettlement, 1945-1950, p. 2.
33
Reinisch, ‘We Shall Rebuild Anew a Powerful Nation’, p. 468.
34
Cited in Dushnyk and Gibbons, Refugees are People, p. 49.
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executed as soon as they crossed the border.35

As a result, many DPs concocted false background stories, and an entire
underground industry grew up providing false identity papers for “Poles
from the Urals” (that is, Soviet citizens attempting to pass as citizens of
pre-1939 Poland).36 A British officer noted the difficulties of identification
and classification for Allied military authorities, and UNRRA:
Was [the ‘DP’] a Jugoslav? Then he might be a Serbian Chetnik
who had fought against Tito, but professed undying love for
England. Or he might be a Tito Partisan, captured by the Germans
but now escaped and trying to make his way back to Jugoslavia. Or
again he might be a member of Pavelich’s infamous Ustachi, who
would no doubt attempt to conceal his identity. Was he a Russian?
Then he could be a runaway Cossack, or an escaped Red Army
prisoner, or a Latvian who left Latvia before it became part of the
Soviet Union, or a displaced Soviet citizen who just did not want to
go back home.37

The underground industry for false documents consisted of individual
entrepreneurs as well as emigrant institutions such as the Tolstoy
Foundation. DP employees of UNRRA were also involved.38 This occurred
concurrently with the practice of Nazi collaborators hiding their identity, or

35

See also National Library of Australia (NLA), MS 8128, Unpublished manuscript by H. G.
Brooks (Department of Immigration), ‘Displaced Persons Volume 1’, p. 12.
36
Margarethe Gabriel, cited in Anne Kuhlmann-Smirnov, The Resettlement of Soviet--Russian
Displaced Persons and the Politics of ‘Fidelity’, Arizona State University, Place of Refuge Panel
Series, http:www.asu.edu/clas/history/ proj/refugee/articles/kuhlmann.htm, viewed 15 February
2008, p. 9.
37
War Office 170/4461, Public Records Office, HQ 36 Infantry Brigade, War Diary, cited in
Mather, Aftermath of War, p. 79.
38
Kuhlmann-Smirnov, The Resettlement of Soviet--Russian Displaced Persons and the Politics of
‘Fidelity’, pp. 7, 9; V. L. Borin, The Uprooted Survive: A Tale of Two Continents (London, 1959),
pp. 128-129; Cohen, ‘Between Relief and Politics’, p. 444; Kim Salomon, Refugees in the Cold
War: Toward a New International Refugee Regime in the Early Postwar Era (Lund, Sweden,
1991), p. 73.
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changing certain biographical details, in order to be classified as DPs.39

Meanwhile, the erstwhile Soviet citizens were joined by Jews and ‘borderhoppers’ (or ‘infiltrees’) fleeing the East. More than 160,000 Jews left
Poland between 1945 and 1947 due to the very real danger of pogrom
actions, while in 1947 the majority of those leaving the Soviet bloc were
Romanian Jews fleeing via Hungary and Austria.40 Border-hoppers,
usually young, single males from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, were
attempting to escape the encroaching Iron Curtain – “Communism-in-themaking” - in what has been termed the phenomenon of “the Voting
Feet”.41

By this time, the hundreds of DP camps were regarded as “sociological
and psychological cauldrons” as the heterogenous groupings of DPs
battled on ethnic, religious and political grounds.42 One contemporary
described the DPs as an “incredible, almost comical, melting-pot of
peoples and nationalities sizzling dangerously in the very heart of
Europe”.43 Jewish DPs, in particular, were forced to isolate themselves
from the majority DP camps, characterized by an American reporter as
39

See, for example, Ruth Balint’s investigation of Károly Zentai’s documented identity changes.
Ruth Balint, ‘Australia, Hungary and the case of Károly Zentai’, Inside Story,
http://inside.org.au/australia-hungary-and-the-case-of-karoly-zentai/, viewed 20 October 2010, pp.
8-9.
40
Kochavi, ‘The Politics of Displaced Persons in Post-War Europe, 1945-1950’, p. 3.
41
Sandor Berger, An Appendix to An Appendix of Prose, A Supplement to A Supplement of ‘I
Protest’: The Letters and Articles of Sandor Berger, Australia, 1964-1968 (Sydney, 1968), p. 307;
Victoria Zabukovec, The Second Landing (Penneshaw, Kangaroo Island, SA, 1993), p. 289.
42
Lubomyr Luciuk, Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons (Toronto, 2000), p. 143.
43
Tadeusz Borowski, cited in Holian, Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism, p. 1.
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“camps for collaborators”.44 The DPs had to cope with the administration
of their lives by UNRRA and the occupation authorities, which frequently
included transfers from camp to camp, as well as deal with local Austrian
or German officials.45

In this context, a specific DP collective identity, or community, failed to
emerge in post-war Europe; instead, a sense of “reactive” diaspora and
exile mission was established.46 The DP camps, or “DP Municipalities”,
encouraged by UNRRA to have a form of self-sufficiency, were usually
nationality specific and attempted to keep a (homogenous) national
sensibility

alive

through

schools,

cultural

activities,

and

national

celebrations and commemoration days.47 Historian Marian J. Rubchak has
described the camps as “a matrix for cultural preservation, and even
further development, in a relatively isolated environment”.48 The camps

44

Cited in Suzanne D. Rutland, ‘Sanctuary for Whom? Jewish Victims and Nazi Perpetrators in
Post-War Australian Migrant Camps’, Conference Paper, Beyond Camps and Forced Labour,
The Second International Multidisciplinary Conference at the Imperial War Museum, London, 1113 January 2006 (unpublished), p. 12.
45
Luciuk, Searching for Place, p. 143; Anna D Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann, The Exile Mission: The
Political Polish Diaspora and Polish Americans, 1939-1956 (Athens, Ohio, 2004), p. 77.
46
G. Daniel Cohen, ‘Remembering Post-War Displaced Persons: From Omission to
Resurrection’, in Mareike König and Rainer Ohliger, eds., Enlarging European Memory: Migration
Movements in Historical Perspective (Ostfildern, Germany, 2006), p. 90; Egon F. Kunz, ‘The
Refugee Experience: Being a Refugee’, Refugees: The Challenge of the Future, Academy of the
Social Science of Australia, Fourth Academy Symposium, 3-4 November 1980, Proceedings, p.
123.
47
Reinisch, ‘We Shall Rebuild Anew a Powerful Nation’, pp. 470-471; Cohen, ‘The Politics of
Recognition’, p. 136; Laura Hilton, ‘Cultural Nationalism in Exile: The Case of Polish and Latvian
Displaced Persons’, The Historian, Vol. 71, no. 2 (Summer 2009), 280-318,
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/csrj/article/viewFile/1520/1823, viewed 25 October
2010.
p. 285.
48
Marian J. Rubchak, ‘Dancing with the Bones: A Comparative Study of Two Ukrainian Exile
Societies’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, Vol. 2 (1993), p. 360.
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became a training ground for community leaders and modeled a
community building process to be used after resettlement.49 As well as a
reconstruction of nationality, then, the DP camps could also be said to
have provided a construction of national sentiment in diaspora.50

The most obvious example of an emergent identity is that of the Jewish
survivors of the Holocaust and the state of Israel, which historian Dan
Diner has argued “had its beginnings [in the Jewish DP camps] in
southern Germany”.51 These emergent nation-building and/or diasporic
identities occurred simultaneously with the ongoing excision of the DPs
from both the polity and historical memory of Germany and the expanded
Soviet Union.52 Some DP groups were thus fighting not only for national
and cultural preservation (or, arguably, creation), but also their own
identity, purpose and agency as ‘nationalists’ and ‘exiles’ rather than
‘refugees’.53

For UNRRA and UNRRA workers, however, a lack of agency on the part
of the DPs was assumed. Historian Peter Gatrell has noted that the
dominant attitude of relief workers seems to have been one of “personal
49

Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann, ‘The Polish Post-World II Diaspora’, p. 52; Anna Bramwell, Refugees
in the Age of Total War (London, Boston, 1988), p. 205; Hilton, ‘Cultural Nationalism in Exile’, p.
297.
50
Rubchak, ‘Dancing with the Bones’, p. 360; see also Kavita Datla, ‘Displacement Camps: Sites
of Ethnic Renewal and Nationalism’,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~ghost20j/classweb/ghost20j/displacement%20camps%20page.html,
viewed 4 May 2010.
51
Dan Diner, cited in Cohen, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, p. 129.
52
Cohen, ‘Remembering Post-War Displaced Persons’, pp. 93-94, 337.
53
Hilton, ‘Cultural Nationalism in Exile’, p. 282.
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adventure and self-fulfillment”, together with an individualized and
collective

agency

(and

developing

professionalism)

involved

in

overcoming “the arduous and sometimes hazardous nature” of their work.
They were usually reluctant to ascribe much agency to the DPs
themselves, and there was little attempt to consult with the DPs about
their future.54

DPs were described by sociologists and psychologists working with the
international bodies as “apathetic” and “cantankerous”.55 In one report
commissioned by the Welfare Division of UNRRA, a summary of “the
psychology of Displaced Persons” used descriptors such as “[rude],
[crude] behaviour, aggressiveness and touchiness”, “apathy”, “phantasyridden”

and

“unreal”

thinking,

“jealousy”,

“recklessness”,

“deep

despondencies”, “hypochondrial complaining” and “mental misery”.56 Peter
Gatrell has argued that this sort of pathologising of the DPs also
infantilized them, and justified all forms of external intervention.57 Indeed,
the UNRRA report suggested that the “tools of repair” were “simple
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enough” – food, clothing, material help and “administrative guidance”.58

UNRRA tried tactics such as reducing rations and frequently relocating the
DPs, as well as allowing Soviet representatives undue influence, in an
attempt to force the DPs home.59 DPs showed some agency by resisting
these entreaties, and refusing repatriation. In an extensive repatriation poll
carried out in May 1946, for example, of the DPs in the US Zone, 89%
rejected repatriation, and 9% refused to participate. Those who refused
repatriation expressed, in “a more or less violent form, disagreements and
dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime”. Ukrainians kept insisting on
referring to themselves as ‘stateless’.60 Some refugees also embarked on
spontaneous unauthorised journeys around Europe.61

When even bribing the DPs to go home with a sixty-day ration of food
didn’t work - ‘Operation Carrot’ - it became apparent that UNRRA’s
primary aim of repatriation was “sheer wasted effort” and that the DPs had
become, in the words of Daniel Cohen, a problematic “collective
anachronism”, an irritating remnant of the Second World War in a Europe
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which was quickly forming Cold War sides.62

It was argued by the Polish-American Congress (an umbrella organization
of Polish-Americans and Polish-American organizations formed in the
United States in 1944), and others, that the United States, and by
extension the United Nations, had a moral responsibility to solve the DP
problem, as “their plight is attributable to the Yalta agreement to which
America was party”.63 For the Communist nations, DPs who refused
repatriation were “enemies and traitors, not only of their own countries, but
of all the United Nations”.64 Meanwhile, UNRRA had no authority to keep
caring for the Jews, border-hoppers and Soviet citizens who refused
repatriation, and no authority to initiate resettlement.

In this context of “extreme [diplomatic] touchiness”, political debates
between the three countries (the United States, the United Kingdom and
France) administering the DP camps in occupied Germany and Austria,
and the countries of origin of the majority of renegade DPs (the Soviet
Republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, as well as Poland and
Yugoslavia) took place throughout 1946.65 In April, the International
Refugee Organisation (IRO) officially replaced UNRRA as a temporary
agency of the UN.
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In September 1946 the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced
Persons (run by the UN Economic and Social Council) resolved protection
for:
3 (b) those persons who have been displaced, as a direct or
indirect result of the second World War, from their countries of
nationality or residence, prior to (a specified date), or who were
outside of their countries of nationality or residence on that date,
and who definitely, in complete freedom and after receiving full
knowledge of the facts, including adequate information from the
governments of their countries of nationality or residence, are
unwilling to return to those countries and are further unwilling to
avail themselves of the protection of the governments of those
countries.66
This definition now included those Soviet citizens who had refused
repatriation, thus enlarging the category of Displaced Persons under the
responsibility of the United Nations.

In December 1946 the draft constitution of the International Refugee
Organisation (IRO), specifying the IRO’s field of operations and promising
to “find new homes elsewhere” for unrepatriable DPs, was adopted by a
vote of 30 to 5 with 18 abstentions on 15 December 1946.67 The ultimate
responsibility for the UN was now to resettle the burgeoning group of
eligible Displaced Persons, most of whom by this time were unrepatriable
66
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Soviet citizens or those who refused to return to their now Soviet-occupied
homelands.

The IRO (1946-1952) was formally charged with resettling the DPs and in
the meantime, maintaining and protecting them in the same camp system
set up by UNRRA (1943-1946).68 The IRO became responsible for the
“care and control” of 1.5 million DPs and ‘bona fide’ refugees, including
older generations of League of Nations and pre-war refugees. Those
ineligible for IRO protection included war criminals, quislings, traitors,
anybody who had participated in the persecution of civilians of an allied
nation or voluntarily assisted enemy forces, common criminals, persons of
German ethnic origin and persons enjoying the financial assistance and
protection of their country of nationality.69

All these processes established the IRO as a politicised international
bureaucracy, whose major preoccupation was the categorization of the
“administrative fiction” of DP eligibility.70 One of its main tasks was issuing
Identity Cards verifying the holder as a “genuine refugee or displaced
person” able to access emigration channels.71 This work followed on from
UNRRA’s screening practices, and in fact the IRO launched a massive
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review of individual cases already evaluated under UNRRA due to
widespread “discrepancies and incoherence”.72 The IRO Identity Cards
certified a politically blameless past, safeguarded the holder from
repatriation, guaranteed continued maintenance and enabled possible
resettlement.73

The screening process, while necessary, was not particularly stringent,
even “superficial and in the eyes of some, ‘corrupt’”. The Eligibility Manual
“made clear that the IRO was not particularly enthusiastic about screening
for war criminals”, and that a certain amount of untruthfulness was
expected.74 Historian David Cesarani has noted that that UNRRA and IRO
screening was “so weak that, in reality, it was useful only for public
relations purposes”.75

Even though ‘Displaced Person’ remained the official IRO term for all
groups under its mandate, and eventuated as the historical signifier of the
disparate groups in Europe, a subtle change had taken place regarding
both terminology and eligibility for refugee status.76 A DP could become a
‘refugee’ if, on refusing repatriation, he or she demonstrated a “valid
objection” to such repatriation.77
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‘Political Refugees’

After June 1948, in the context of increasing anti-Soviet sentiment, the
IRO’s eligibility focus changed from “genuine” victims of Nazism to
anticommunist “dissidents”.78 In this way, and with the stroke of a pen, all
Soviet citizen DPs and other unrepatriables became ‘refugees’ from
communism, and indeed by the end of the 1940s the two categories of
‘displaced persons’ and ‘refugees’ merged into the official appellations
‘political refugees’ and ‘stateless refugees’.79

The US-controlled IRO concentrated on an evaluation of individual
‘dissidence’, paving the way for a broader notion of refugees, one which
privileged the individual over the state.80 The ideal-type refugee was now
assumed to have ‘genuine’ (democratic) political creeds as well as
‘genuine’ reasons to fear persecution. This post-war change to individual
rather than group eligibility (except in the case of Jews, who were classed
as eligible because they were Jews), with an emphasis on ‘proof’ and
‘persecution,’ led to an attempt by the United Nations to codify an
international legal framework for refugees, incorporating a language of
78
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protection and individual human rights.81 The 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defined a refugee as a
person who:
Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence … is
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.82
The Convention embodied the historical, geopolitical specificity of the DP
experience as it applied only to people who became refugees as a result
of events that occurred prior to 1 January 1951, and was obviously aimed
at the DPs as Western-perceived victims of Communist state persecution.
Signatories even had the option of limiting their obligations to European
refugees.83 Academic Gil Loescher, an expert in international refugee
policy, has noted that “the definition had the added advantage that it would
serve ideological purposes by stigmatizing the fledgling Communist
regimes as persecutors”.84
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From being members of ethnic, religious and political groups, the refugees
were now under pressure to present themselves to the IRO as individual
“asylum seekers”.85 Daniel Cohen has identified a “new theatricality”
imposed by the IRO under this system, where the incentive of refugee
status encouraged an overemphasized “presentation of self”, such as the
open expression of fear. In this way, “storytelling” became of primary
importance in order to fit the Western vision and definition of individual
political persecution. This “Cold War myopia” privileged the “political
persecute”, a “true” refugee, over the “false” “economic migrant”.86 In this
way, the DPs were further homogenized, as they were reduced to a
question of their Cold War identities.

It can be argued that the IRO’s pressure on individuals to present
themselves as ‘political refugees’ obviated any of the age-old economic
motives those from Eastern Europe may have had for refusing repatriation
and aspiring to resettlement in the West.87 According to one IRO officer,
motives of adventure and a tradition of economic migration applied to
“most” of the DPs; others estimated that only 25% of the DPs in August
1948 were “genuine refugees” as set out by the IRO. In such cases, IRO
85
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policy was to reject only the few who were “naïve enough to admit that
they are economic migrants”.88

Regardless of the motivations or means of escape of the various types of
DPs, now re-branded ‘political refugees’, by 1948 it was clear that it was
up to the IRO to solve the problem of how to resettle these ‘Last Million’ of
internationally recognized DPs, made up of 636,000 DPs under the care of
UNRRA, 60,000 from camps under military rule, and 16,000 who had
been under the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee for
Refugees, as well as around 900,000 refugees who made their way to the
West from the encroaching Soviet bloc in the years to 1951.89 The solution
came as the IRO re-branded the DPs as ‘workers’ and ‘migrants’. As one
UNRRA relief worker observed in 1947: “Fortunately, the present
manpower shortage in Western countries has revolutionized the outlook
for DPs”.90 The emphasis for DPs now was on exchanging their IRO
identity card to obtain an IRO passport.91

‘Workers’ and ‘Migrants’

From 1948, the IRO funded migration to any country willing to accept the
DPs. Some countries, including Turkey and the new state of Israel,
88
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accepted DPs from a particular cultural background, and the United States
accepted a small number as “compassionate cases”.92 However, most
interested countries were looking for workers to regenerate post-war
economies. The first European schemes involved recruitments by Britain,
the Netherlands and Belgium of “bright-eyed [and] healthy” single persons
or childless married couples as short-term workers to fill industry
shortages in coal mining and textile manufacturing.93 In Britain a limited
scheme was initiated for young Baltic women (the ‘Balt Cygnets’) to be
used as maids or sanatorium attendants for the first three months of their
stay. Then, around 100,000 non-Jewish DPs were renamed ‘European
Voluntary Workers’ and defined primarily as labour migrants.94 Canada
and Argentina were the first countries outside Europe to take advantage of
the labour potential, with Canada similarly recruiting workers for two year
‘apprenticeships’ in specific industries, including lumbering, mining,
agriculture and domestic service.95 In 1948 the United States finally
passed legislation, the Displaced Persons Act, in order to sidestep earlier
migration quota restrictions to ultimately admit 400,000 DPs under a
sponsorship system whereby the (private or organizational) sponsor had
to guarantee housing and employment.
92
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By 1948, then, the eligibility of DPs as both Displaced Persons and
‘refugees’ had morphed into the “selection, control and regimentation” of
both the IRO and the international community on “muscle-gathering
missions”.96 The DPs, who had earlier presented themselves to the IRO
as Cold War ‘political refugees’, were now coerced into presenting
themselves to fit recruiters’ needs. For Canadian immigration authorities,
intellectuals turned into lumberjacks, workers and farmers; for the United
States, they became farmers and mechanics. In Australia, all DPs were
re-categorized as ‘labourers’ and ‘domestics’, and required to complete a
two year work contract.

As well as an emphasis on manual work skills, there was a strong ‘racial’
component in the international community’s selections. The United
Nations reported that “without openly declaring their unwillingness to
accept Jewish immigrants, the various recruiting missions invariably reject
all the Jewish candidates”.97 It has also been argued that non-Jewish,
particularly Baltic DPs, were specifically recruited for British work schemes
to stem the immigration of non-white Africans and Asians, due to the
racially-based belief that European DPs were “of good human stock”.98
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There was a hierarchy of race (and class) in the selection process, with
middle-class Balts seen as the “elite of the refugee problem”.99 The Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg recruited single workers with no dependents, Balts
preferred. In the United States, almost a quarter of all visas were reserved
for Balts.100 Australia’s first shipments were made up exclusively of the socalled ‘beautiful Balts’ from Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia - blonde, blueeyed migrants who would easily fit into a White Australian demographic.

Historian Laura Hilton has argued that some DP groups were complicit in
such representations. Poles and Balts depicted themselves to potential
settlement countries as “strong, handsome, hardworking, God-fearing
lovers of democracy”.101 In one publication produced in a DP camp,
Latvians “somewhat eerily emphasized that 60% of the population had fair
hair and blue eyes”, and that they were physically healthy. They also
successfully emphasized their anti-communism.102 Some DPs sent letters
to the governments of potential resettlement countries, assuring them of
their “race’s” assimilability.103
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In effect, then, the IRO, admittedly “hat in hand”, presided over and
administered a “labour-recruitment program on an international scale”.104
The Soviets alleged that “a real slave trade” was flourishing, with the IRO
the “main purveyor of cheap labour for the capitalist countries”, and even
The Times (London) was inclined to agree: “There is a whiff of the slave
market in the invitations to DPs to enter most countries”.105 Some IRO
leaders attacked this “skimming of the cream” and “embargo on brains” as
ruinous, a denial of the organisation’s humanitarian aims.106 However, to
the recruiting countries the refugees were “immense pools of manpower
representing every known skill”, and the IRO was soon dubbed by the
press the “largest travel agency in human history”.107

Although the IRO was intermittently uncomfortable with facilitating the
recruitment of mass labour, there was also a perception that labour would
have a moralizing and rehabilitative effect on the DPs, negating the “evil
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and

anti-social

consequences

of

continued

idleness”.108

Allied

employment policies attempted to turn DPs from “slaves of the Nazi
regime” to “labourers suitable for democracies”, while DP “apathy” was
contrasted with state and agency “action” in a “grand vision of
reconstruction and replacement”.109

The actual process of the IRO pipe-line involved individual DPs applying
for immigration to the IRO, which selected successful applicants through a
process of medical, professional and biographical reviews.110 The
recruiting countries then often made their own selections out of these
successful applicants, entailing a second review process. Those rejected
by recruiting countries as “sub-standard” included the ill, the infirm, the
old, and those who stayed to care for them, as well as intellectuals, those
with too many dependants and single mothers.111 Left to fend for
themselves, this “minus” or “hard core” had “passed through the sieves of
108
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nations”.112 They were the “most truly forgotten human flotsam of the war”:
“despair was the footnote”.113 In 1949 there were 20,000 seriously
handicapped persons, 30,000 of their dependents, and approximately
100,000 others with limited opportunities for resettlement.114 The IRO
initiated and administered retraining schemes in an attempt to resettle
these DPs, but with minimal success. Some were accepted by Norway in
“good-will” transports.115 The rest were somehow to integrate into the
Germany economy as ‘homeless foreigners’.116 The last operative camp, a
Jewish DP camp near Munich still housing 177,000 people, was dissolved
in February 1957; all of the others had closed by 1952.117 1959-60 was
ascribed World Refugee Year in order to highlight those DPs who still had
not found a home.118

Despite the failure of the ‘hard core’, and the latent issues of nationalisms
and agency, the IRO scheme was largely viewed as a political and
humanitarian success. The immediate post-war ‘Displaced Persons’ had
been successfully re-categorised and joined by ‘refugees’ and ‘political
refugees’. The thorny issue of repatriation to the Soviet Union had been
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tackled head-on with the formation of the International Refugee
Organisation, and more than one million DPs, now renamed ‘workers’ and
‘migrants’, were re-settled by the end of 1951. This vision of success was
nowhere more apparent than in Australia, where DPs were re-branded as
‘migrant workers’, who were to rapidly become ‘New Australians’.

